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The outcomes of the 2012 presidential election in Senegal and the 2010 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire display a notable and significant contrast: peaceful concession of the losing incumbent, or the lack thereof. Abdoulaye Wade’s electoral concession and peaceful handover of power to Macky Sall in Senegal demonstrates a striking contrast to Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to concede his electoral defeat to Alassane Ouattara, and the subsequent violence that ravaged Côte d’Ivoire for months after. This paper aims to address this disparity and answer the question as to why Wade willingly and swiftly conceded defeat, while Gbagbo clung to the presidency for months, even after impartial and international observers agreed that he lost. In other words, what factors and dynamics differed in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire that influenced these opposing decisions?
Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire were chosen for this paper as a means of using a comparison to explore the broader topic of peaceful power alternation and thus provide a thesis that can be applied to other cases in addition to this country comparison study. Moreover, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire were chosen for this specific country comparison study due to their disparate power alternations (and thus different political experiences), while also possessing striking similarities in other facets. Geographically, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are both situated in West Africa. Historically (and now linguistically), Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are colonial sister states, both having been French colonies, and both becoming independent countries in 1960. Demographically, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are both ethnically diverse, which will become salient throughout the argument of this paper.
The question investigated in this study is more relevant and important than simply providing an explanation for the disparate outcomes in the elections in these two specific countries. According to the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), “the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections constitutes an unconstitutional change of government.” And, because unconstitutional changes of government in Africa have negative consequences for democratic consolidation on the continent, it is imperative to understand what drives these unconstitutional changes so that they can be prevented, thereby preventing the democratization project in Africa from failing or stagnating. In fact, scholar J. Shola Omotola specifically argues that the refusal of Gbagbo to concede defeat and step down in 2010 is a sign of the crisis of democratization in Africa. On the other hand, Senegal’s peaceful transition in 2012 constituted its achievement of the two-turnover test, a narrow measure of democratic consolidation. The two-turnover test is passed when the opposition party that ousts an incumbent party (which occurred in 2000 when Wade defeated Diouf, who peacefully conceded) also accepts defeat in a subsequent election. In addition to this question’s importance to democratic consolidation, it is also relevant in preventing violence. Though the post-electoral violence seen in Côte d’Ivoire is a function of a lack of democratic consolidation, the sheer death and destruction that occurred is an additional reason as to why the dynamics of electoral concession and peaceful power alternation ought to be explored.
This paper argues that the ultimate reason explaining the disparate concession outcomes is a function of zero-sum politics versus positive-sum politics, which are present in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal respectively. Through exploring two underlying, pre-democratization variables, the catalyst of democratization, and two consequential, post-democratization variables, this paper will demonstrate how and why Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire differ in terms of zero-sum/positive-sum politics, and how this ultimate reason explains why Wade chose to peacefully concede his defeat while Gbagbo did not. After reviewing the relevant literature on this topic and addressing the overarching theory and research design, the argument for this paper will proceed as follows: evidence and characteristics of the two underlying variables, the existence of/lack of strong local leaders and democratic/ethnic historical norms and path dependence, will be associated with the two countries, along with their effects on politicized ethnicity; next, the catalyst of democratization/introduction of multiparty politics and its effects will be explained in relation to the underlying variables; then, the first consequential variable, the lack of/existence of politicized ethnicity, and the second consequential variable, united versus disunited elite structure, will be associated with the two countries, and their disparate impacts will be demonstrated in order to explain why politics in Senegal is positive-sum, while politics in Côte d’Ivoire is zero-sum; lastly, the dynamics of zero-sum/positive-sum politics will be used to explain the disparity in electoral concession and peaceful presidential powerful alternation, before concluding that more research on successful peaceful power alternation and democratic consolidation in Africa is necessary.
Currently there is no literature that compares these specific countries and elections, and thus there is presently no definitive explanation or overarching variable as to why Wade conceded while Gbagbo did not, providing significant importance to the results of this paper. However, there are some theories that pertain to the specific cases independently, though none of these explanations constituted the main focus of a research study, nor were they thoroughly explored, explained, and validated.
In his doctoral dissertation, Abiodun Surajudeen Fatai argues that “the refusal of Laurent Gbagbo to relinquish power after he was defeated [in the 2010 election] in Côte d’Ivoire was the consequence of political instability.” This argument is rather vague as it provides little explanation to the involved dynamics. Next, arguing that Gbagbo was trying to cause political instability (in contrast to his decision being a consequence of it), J. Shola Omotola believes that Gbagbo may have been trying to force a power-sharing agreement in which the other leader would have little power, similar to the political situation before the 2010 election in which northerner Guillaume Soro served as Gbagbo’s prime minister. Omotola explains that refusing to step down and resorting to violence was a strategy that attempted to induce peace-seeking negotiators into agreement on a superficial power-sharing deal, and states that “it is otherwise difficult to understand why Laurent Gbagbo held on to power in the face of overwhelming international agreement as to the actual winner of the election.” While this explanation is a possibility, it fails to provide a root reason for why Gbagbo felt that he needed to remain in power. This assumption that Gbagbo simply wanted to stay in power out of pure-self interest in its benefits is echoed by Thomas Bassett. William Milam and Jennifer Jones write, “after a decade in power, he believed himself anointed by the heavens and indispensable to his people,” and cite that pastors even convinced him to stay in power since only God could remove him and because Ouattara represented the devil. This argument is difficult to defend, but it does add to the chorus of explanations that cite preventing Ouattara specifically from becoming president.
While Cyril Daddieh was writing in 2001 and thus not commenting specifically on the 2010 election, his article offers two explanations as to why past Ivorian presidents tried to prevent an Ouattara presidency. First, he argues that the dominant southern political culture (of which Gbagbo is part of) views transferring presidential power to a northerner as an “unacceptable violation of the natural order of relations between northerners and southerners.” Daddieh explains that southern political culture stereotypes northerners as untrustworthy, and therefore conceding power to Ouattara is seen as dangerous. Secondly, Daddieh notes that Gbagbo’s lifelong experience of leading struggles against Côte d’Ivoire’s first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, makes him feel entitled to the presidency. In contrast, Gbagbo believes that Ouattara has little claim to the presidency since he had not paid any real political dues by being significantly involved during the presidency of Houphouët-Boigny. This second argument is weak since Ouattara served as Houphouët-Boigny’s prime minister and thus was involved politically (simply on the opposing side), while the first argument is partially accurate, and will be expanded upon and incorporated into the larger argument in this paper.
The existing argument as to why Senegal experienced peaceful power alternation in 2012 focuses on an elite consensus about democracy and its related component of peaceful power transition. Abiodun Surajudeen Fatai argues that a combination of a democratic culture due to its colonial introduction in the Four Communes of Senegal, and the fact that Diouf set a precedent in 2000 by peacefully conceding, created a consensus among political elites that respecting democracy and peacefully conceding an electoral defeat is preferable, thus leading Wade to follow this consensus. While this argument is valid and will serve as part of the larger argument in this paper, it fails to incorporate further explanations as to why this political consensus is maintained. Therefore, when considering the existing literature explaining the reasons for the lack of/existence of peaceful power alternation in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, it is evident that some of the arguments put forth constitute valid explanations, though they are only pieces of the larger argument that incorporates them into the theory of zero-sum/positive-sum politics.
The overarching theory in this paper, that of zero-sum/positive-sum politics, draws on the elite structure theory presented by John Higley and Michael Burton in their article “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns,” and their book, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Additionally, this paper combines other theories, namely those involving the role of politicized ethnicity and path dependence, into this overarching elite structure theory. The core of Higley and Burton’s theory revolves around the different political outcomes stemming from united and disunited elite structures. Higley and Burton state that “a national elite is consensually united when its members share a largely tacit consensus about rules and codes of political conduct, and participate in an integrated structure of interaction that provides them with relatively reliable and effective access to each other,” and that “a national elite is consensually disunited when its members share few or no understandings about the proprieties of political conduct and engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional or sectoral boundaries.” Higley and Burton argue that a united national elite produces stable regimes in which “competitions for political power have a positive-sum or ‘politics as bargaining’ character.” On the contrary, a disunited national elite produces unstable regimes, and “partisan factions and elites in different sectors manifestly distrust each other and engage in unrestrained, often violent struggles for dominance that have a zero-sum or ‘politics as war’ character.” Through employing a comparative study of electoral concession and lack thereof in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, and applying a historical analysis of the underlying variables, this paper primarily uses qualitative and secondary, literature-based evidence to support its core argument.
The first underlying, pre-democratization variable is the existence of/lack of strong local leaders, and largely stems from Dominika Koter’s argument in her book, Beyond Ethnic Politics in Africa. Koter distinguishes between two forms of non-programmatic electoral mobilization: “directly relying on voters from one’s own ethnic background” and “indirectly working through electoral intermediaries.” Koter defines intermediaries as “local leaders who command moral authority, control resources, and can influence the electoral behavior of their dependents.” These two forms lead to opposing outcomes in terms of politicized ethnicity, the first consequential variable in this paper. When strong local leaders exist in a polity, politicians avoid ethnic politics and mobilize through the local leaders, and thus ethnicity does not become politicized. When strong local leaders are absent in a polity, politicians default to ethnic mobilization, which creates ethnic blocs and thus politicizes ethnicity. This is especially relevant in the types of patronage networks created, a salient political reality in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. Patronage forms along personalist lines in polities with strong local leaders, while it forms along ethnic lines in polities without strong leaders.
In Senegal, the existence of strong local elites has led politicians to rely on them, thereby creating cross-ethnic allegiances, and preventing voting along ethnic lines. Koter specifically states, “Senegalese local elites have much more social clout than their counterparts in many other African states,” which demonstrates the importance of strong local leaders in Senegal, particularly the marabouts of the Sufi brotherhoods, who have historically been a center of political mobilization. Sufism is a mystical denomination of Islam; its religious leaders, known as marabouts, are socially significant because they are perceived as holy men to whom their followers owe their allegiance, even in political matters. Marabouts have historically urged their followers to vote for certain candidates (known as an ndigel) in exchange for patronage from those political candidates. Therefore, marabouts have served as credible intermediaries between politicians and voters, benefitting the politicians by allowing them to expand their support across ethnic groups. Because of this opportunity to bridge ethnic differences via personalistic patronage networks, politicized ethnicity has been historically avoided in Senegal, and has yet to arise to this day.
Côte d’Ivoire displays a contrasting history in relation to this variable. The southern part of Côte d’Ivoire, where power has historically been concentrated, possesses a history of “weak hierarchical ties,” which Koter defines as “ties of dependence between local authority figures and their followers.” As a consequence of a historical lack of strong local leaders in Côte d’Ivoire, the possibility of ethnic mobilization and politicization has never been eliminated since cross-ethnic relations and patronage networks have never supplanted its existence. It is important to note that ethnicity has not always been outwardly politicized on the national level, such as during the rule of Houphouët-Boigny, and such explanations will be provided in a later section.
As noted in the literature review, some scholars have used path dependence theory to argue that colonial-era introduction of democracy in urban areas of Senegal is the reason as to why peaceful power alternation occurs. This paper seeks to incorporate this argument, though it does not argue for a direct link, but rather that the role of path dependency, like the existence of strong local leaders, demonstrates its impact through the lack of politicized ethnicity. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, path dependency stemming from ethnically-tied patronage networks contributed to a significant politicization of ethnicity after the introduction of multiparty politics.
Senegal’s democratic tradition is the result of heavy assimilation to French culture in Senegal’s urban coastal enclaves during the colonial period. Senegalese elites in these communities, named the Four Communes, were Western-educated and individualistic in thought. Such assimilation to French culture facilitated familiarity and limited experience with democratic self-government, party formation, and civic associations beginning in the early 1800s. Therefore, many of Senegal’s political elites have and continue to consider themselves “heirs to the oldest tradition of democracy and self-rule in Africa.” Tom Lodge writes that “pride in lineage traced to colonial assimilationist policies has to an extent exercised a self-restraining function within the Senegalese executive, helping to preserve reasonably civil and democratic norms within elite politics.” Furthermore, because Senegalese elites have consistently and continue to conceive of politics as “organized along individualistic lines in the classic liberal sense,” these elites “trust, associate, and cooperate with others based on common interests rather than familial, ethnic, regional, or religious ties,” thereby highlighting the causation from democratic path dependence to the lack of politicized ethnicity in Senegal.
During the early years of the country’s existence post-independence, home-town associations formed throughout Côte d’Ivoire with the stated intentions of representing the interests of local communities (e.g. economic and cultural development) within a given area. However, despite the denial that these were ethnic associations, they relied on the principle of ethnic solidarity in order to create and define a constituency, thus making the historically predominant ethnic group in a given area serve as the main basis of identification for the association. These ethnic-based associations became the basis for patronage networks, as urban elites with ties to the associated ethnic groups mobilized support from these associations in exchange for economic benefits. Thus, this “utilisation of ethnic associations by elites to consolidate their own economic and political position,” demonstrates how ethnically-tied patronage networks existed during the rule of Houphouët-Boigny, prior to the introduction of multiparty politics, even as his government attempted to suppress such politicized ethnicity. This next section will elaborate on how path dependence created by a history of ethnically-tied patronage networks has exacerbated the politicization of ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire by way of democratization as a catalyst. Democratization simply served to uncover and inflame the politicized ethnicity that had been continually checked on the national level, but which continued to pervade Ivorian society for decades.
The two underlying variables both demonstrate an effect on the lack of/existence of the politicization of ethnicity, but only after democratization and the introduction of multiparty politics. In other words, these two underlying variables established disparate conditions so that upon the moment of democratization, these disparities would be realized and manifested in the lack of politicized ethnicity in Senegal, and the notable politicization of ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire.
During the 1980s, both Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire faced slowing economies that contributed to their democratic transitions. This section demonstrates how democratization served as a catalyst for the notable disparities between the countries regarding the politicization of ethnicity, but that the disparities in the aforementioned underlying variables are the ultimate cause for differences in politicized ethnicity; democratization simply served to exacerbate politicized ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire, while having no impact on its non-existence in Senegal, thereby further augmenting the difference in political dynamics in the two countries that serve to explain their opposite experiences in peaceful power alternation.
In Senegal, a deteriorating economy, specifically declining agricultural credit, meant that there were fewer resources to finance the patronage link between the ruling political elites and the marabouts. This decrease in economic benefits upset the patronage networks that had been in place for decades, and marabouts gradually dissociated themselves from the political sphere, with many of them eventually ending the issuance of voting edicts (ndigels). However, even with this collapse of the patronage network and simultaneous democratic transition, ethnicity never became politicized. The aforementioned underlying variables explain why politicized ethnicity did not even enter the political lexicon in Senegal, even as the effects of a declining economy and democratization challenged the political structure that had maintained order in the country for decades. The experience of never having politicized ethnicity and the rich history of cross-ethnic ties (especially in politics) in Senegalese culture is so ingrained that introducing politicized ethnicity, even in a potentially opportunistic moment such as democratization, is unthinkable.
The catalyzing effects of democratization on politicized ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire must be evaluated with consideration of the national-level suppression of politicized ethnicity during the presidency of Houphouët-Boigny. Houphouët-Boigny led a rather inclusive government, incorporating outsiders (e.g. northerners) who possessed talent and expertise. For example, Ouattara served as Houphouët-Boigny’s prime minister at the end of his presidency in the early 1990s. Houphouët-Boigny’s government promoted this inclusive governance strategy through the attempted suppression of ethnic-based organizations; the continued existence and strength of these organizations demonstrates that Houphouët-Boigny’s suppression of politicized ethnicity solely existed on a superficial national level, and that the sudden cessation of his delicately-woven political structure could come about with the correct circumstances since ethnicity was politicized in other aspects and levels of politics and society. Once the economic miracle of Côte d’Ivoire ended in the 1980s, Houphouët-Boigny was no longer able to maintain this political structure in which equally distributed, widespread, personalistic patronage subdued ethnic tensions. This downfall of economic prosperity served as an impetus for democratization in the country, opening up the possibility for the politicization of ethnicity by other political elites. However, Houphouët-Boigny strategically managed to keep his patronage networks and political alliances intact (by way of the skillful political maneuvering he possessed as a result of his lengthy presidential experience), continuing the stifling of ethnic tensions.
After Houphouët-Boigny’s death, ethnic tensions were no longer in check. Houphouët-Boigny’s successor, Henri Konan Bédié, lacked the economic means and political prowess necessary to maintain the cross-ethnic patronage networks and to subdue oppositional opinions. Bédié thus introduced ethnically exclusionary policies as a political strategy, thereby provoking ethnic tensions. Consequently, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a significant escalation of exclusion and overt manipulation of ethnicity as a means for political gain shortly after the introduction of multiparty politics. These policies and practices primarily disadvantaged people from northern-based ethnic groups, most notably demonstrated through the introduction of Ivoirité, a policy that will be further elaborated on in the next section. Bédié’s undermining of Ouattara’s ability to run for president in the 1995 election is one aspect of this policy that notably stoked ethnic (and interrelated) regional and religious tensions. Thus, as demonstrated, multiparty democracy in Côte d’Ivoire did not create pluralism or a more inclusive political system, but in fact the opposite; the introduction of multiparty electoral competition catalyzed the reanimation of ethnic cleavages, this time on the national stage and endorsed by the national government. In 1994, one year after Bédié’s assumption of the presidency, Dwayne Woods wrote that “ethnic associations are increasingly becoming the locus of competition by urban elites in their struggle to gain a clientele base in the new atmosphere created in the country with the reintroduction of competitive multi-party elections in 1991.”
As previously stated, democratization catalyzed a rapid escalation of politicized ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire because the superficial suppression of ethnic differences and tension at the national level during Houphouët-Boigny’s presidency was no longer sustainable, giving way to the reanimation of politicized ethnicity that manifests itself in the two underlying variables explored earlier in this paper. Côte d’Ivoire’s tendency to politicize ethnicity (due to the lack of strong local leaders and a historical, path dependent tradition of ethnically-based home-town associations) resurged during the democratic transition, thus creating the political and social conditions that will eventually explain why Côte d’Ivoire has failed to experience a peaceful alternation of presidential power.
Given that the causes of politicized ethnicity (or lack thereof) have previously been demonstrated, this section aims to establish and prove its non-existence in Senegal and its existence in Côte d’Ivoire. Tom Lodge argues that the worst cases with respect to turnover feature political mobilization around primordial and ancestral concepts (such as ethnicity), though his explanation fails to explain why. After establishing and proving the lack of/existence of politicized ethnicity, this section will demonstrate how the lack of politicized ethnicity leads to a united elite structure, while its existence generates a disunited elite structure, setting up the mechanisms that explain exactly how politicized ethnicity becomes relevant in discussions about power alternation.
Dominika Koter bluntly states that ethnicity does not structure political competition in Senegal. This notion is demonstrated through the fact that none of the major political parties or candidates in the country have an ethnic base; in fact, each party’s electorate is as ethnically diverse as the electorate as a whole. Senegalese elites cut across ethnic lines when vying for support, driven partially by a large personalistic patronage network, even with the weakened participation and influence of the marabouts. Thus, elite formation and circulation is not grounded in ethnicity. As a result, elites in Senegal are not disunited along ethnic lines, giving credence to the statement that “the inception of multiparty politics in Senegal witnessed the resolution of political differences through consultation, dialogue and negotiation rather than violence.” This resolution of political differences hints at the existence of a united elite structure, which will be discussed as the next consequential variable
The situation in Côte d’Ivoire is much more complicated, as it experienced a remarkable and impactful escalation of politicized ethnicity after the end of Houphouët-Boigny’s presidency. Abu Bakarr Bah argues that since the introduction of multiparty elections, party politics have followed the ethnic and associated regional cleavages of the country. As previously stated, much of this politicized ethnicity and increase in ethnic tensions can be attributed to the introduction of Ivoirité. In general, Ivoirité is a form of exclusionary discourse regarding citizenship, with the demonstrated effect of limiting access to the democratic process. Ivoirité was a strategy used by southern parties (which dominated the political system prior to Ouattara’s presidency) to win multiparty elections by reducing the voting power of northerners, and also limiting their choice of candidates. While the policy had various iterations and forms, it generally disqualified from voting or running in an election anyone who did not have two Ivorian-born parents. This statute disproportionately affected northerners whose parents had migrated to Côte d’Ivoire during the presidency of Houphouët-Boigny seeking economic opportunity. This strategy to gain political power in the context of multiparty competition in an ethnically divided state demonstrates how the aforementioned underlying factors allowed for the politicization of ethnicity, and that Ivoirité exacerbated existing ethnic tensions.
Although introduced under President Bédié and constitutionalized by subsequent President Guéï, the policy continued during the first seven years of Gbagbo’s presidency. Gbagbo’s continual denial of full citizenship to many northerners resulted in a civil war that began in 2002, leading to a rebel-held north and a government-controlled south. This civil war flamed ethnic tensions even further. And, while the policy of Ivoirité officially ended in 2007 with the Ouagadougou Peace Accord, politicized ethnicity continued to be used in national political rhetoric, and ethnic tensions endured among the populace. However, the end of the policy meant that many of the previously-excluded northerners could vote and run in the 2010 election, evidently setting up Ouattara’s (who had previously been repeatedly disqualified from running) campaign for the presidency.
The 2010 presidential election itself also exhibits the politicized ethnicity that defines modern Ivorian politics. Thomas Bassett writes, “ethnicity influenced voting behaviour in the 2010 presidential election,” which can be demonstrated through the election’s ethnic vote share. There is a significant positive trend in the Krou vote for Gbagbo (the ethnic group to which he belongs), while there is a negative trend for Ouattara. Conversely, there is a positive trend in the Northern Mandé vote for Ouattara (the ethnic group to which he belongs), while there is a negative trend for Gbagbo. Therefore, ethnicity was evidently politicized prior to and during the 2010 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire. This history of politicized ethnicity, exclusion, and differentiating between elites based on ethnicity creates a disunited elite structure. As elites seek out the vote of their own ethnic groups, they in return provide ethnically-exclusionary patronage since “successful urban sons of a particular area are expected to … redistribute some of their gains.”
As noted in the theory section, this consequential variable stems from the theoretical argument presented by Higley and Burton. This section aims to prove the existence of a united elite structure in Senegal and a disunited elite structure in Côte d’Ivoire in order to later apply Higley and Burton’s argument, that a united national elite produces positive-sum politics and that a disunited national elite produces zero-sum politics, to the specific cases of power alternation in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire in 2012 and 2010 respectively.
In their book, Higley and Burton specifically note the existence of a united elite structure in Senegal. One notable instance that demonstrates this notion is the fact that political elites in Senegal switch parties. In fact, Macky Sall, the winner of the 2012 presidential election to whom Abdoulaye Wade conceded, was not only in the same party as Wade, but was his prime minister before becoming disillusioned with his unconstitutional practices. This specific instance exemplifies that a lack of ethnic politics allows for elites to switch between parties since they are not structured along ethnic lines.This ability demonstrates and further facilitates a united elite structure that involves “consensus about rules and codes of political conduct,” demonstrated by the fact that Sall was never excluded from running against Wade. This elite agreement demonstrates that Senegal maintains a consensually united elite structure “whose value system indicates ‘politics-as-bargaining’ and conflict resolution.” Lastly, the causation from a united elite structure to a positive-sum political system will ultimately be demonstrated to explain the existence of electoral concession and peaceful power alternation in the country.
During the presidency of Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire appeared to have a consensually united elite, as it was artificially bound together by the extensive cross-ethnic patronage networks made possible by the economic miracle. As this paper has demonstrated, elite power struggles and ethno-regional splintering after Houphouët-Boigny’s death and the introduction of multiparty politics ceased whatever elite unity existed in the country. Higley and Burton state that by the 2000s the political elite structure in Côte d’Ivoire was very disunited. This can be evidenced through exemplifying one of Higley and Burton’s characterizations of a disunited elite structure, in which “members of a disunited elite routinely take extreme measures to protect themselves and their interests: killing, imprisoning, banishing opponents, or fomenting rebellions against ascendant factions.” This is evident throughout the post-democratic transition history of Côte d’Ivoire, especially the banishing of opponents through Ivoirité and the rebellious civil war that resulted from it. As such, this disunited elite structure along ethnic lines generates a zero-sum political system, manifesting disastrous consequences for the possibility of peaceful power alternation.
Dominika Koter explains that political competition along ethnic lines creates a zero-sum game, as an ethnic group as a whole is either in power or not. Koter argues that ethnic groups who lose might be marginalized and left without resources (e.g. through ethnically-tied patronage networks). While this is evident in the case of Côte d’Ivoire and will be applied in this section, it is a far more relevant contribution to explain how politicized ethnicity works through a disunited elite structure to then create a zero-sum political system. Explaining this mechanism is also beneficial because it explains and contrasts cases that lack politicized ethnicity, and still uses the same mechanisms to account for disparate outcomes in electoral concession and power alternation. Thus, exhibiting how the lack of/existence of politicized ethnicity works through the mechanism of elite structure is crucial to investigating and explaining the specific cases of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.
In the 2012 presidential election in Senegal, the opposition (many of whom previously supported Wade) galvanized themselves across collective democratic and constitutional rule; ethnicity was as an irrelevant political factor. This collective action against citizens who formerly supported Wade is only possible because citizens are not bound by zero-sum political choices, as candidates and parties are not ethnically-based. As a result, Wade lost the election by so many votes that it would have been difficult to refuse giving up power. While the lopsided election outcome is certainly a factor in Wade’s decision to concede, the key of this paper is to further examine what factors made that choice so easy. Higley and Burton write that in a united elite structure, “elite members enjoy considerable personal security, in the sense that they do not expect to be killed, imprisoned, or otherwise severely penalized for ending up on the losing side of a policy dispute.” This same idea can be applied to ending up on the losing side of a presidential election.
Because politics in Senegal is not zero-sum, in which competing for total political control is necessary for the benefit and survival of an ethnically-tied politician and his ethnic group, Wade did not face a “life or death” decision when he lost his election. As a result of a consensually united elite and the consequent positive-sum political system, Wade had little fear of being killed, violently attacked, or punished in any way as a consequence of losing his presidential power. In a system of positive-sum politics, a cost-benefit analysis favors conceding power over unconstitutionally remaining in office and fighting to retain control. Wade knew that after his presidency he could continue to live the rest of his life as a member of the wealthy elite in peace and comfort. In addition, Wade did not have an ethnically-based, zero-sum relationship with his supporters, and thus his stepping down would not have resulted in detrimental effects to them. Therefore, when Wade was given the option to peacefully concede power to Sall and cement Senegal’s achievement of the two-turnover test, his choice was simple, but only as a result of the positive-sum political system that made giving up power a superior choice to retaining it.
Higley and Burton explain that a disunited elite structure is composed of deep insecurity, especially the fear that all is lost if some other person or faction gets the upper hand. Writing after the 2010-2011 Ivorian Crisis, Abu Bakarr Barr argues that “the electoral outcome compounds the dominance of an ethnic or religious group by the fact that the president controls parliament, the judiciary, police, and military,” and thus the president appoints people loyal to him, often people from his own ethnic group and region. This resulting dominance by the group that wins the election and the concurrent marginalization of the losers is a function of a zero-sum political system, which is clearly evident in the case of the 2010 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire. On one hand, the fact that Gbagbo’s power-sharing deal with Guillaume Soro was set to end with the 2010 election meant that the election was in fact zero-sum, as the victor would gain complete control of the disproportionately powerful executive branch.
Since Gbagbo campaigned on ethno-nationalist policies that sought to again marginalize northerners, it was clear that Gbagbo was mobilizing along ethnic lines, and also that northerners would evidently have a political vendetta against him should he lose the election to northerner Alassane Ouattara. Consequently, Gbagbo held legitimate personal fears of losing his power, confirming the deep insecurity that a defeated incumbent faces in a zero-sum political system. Furthermore, in addition to fearing for himself, Gbagbo feared for his ethnically-related supporters based on the notion that transferring power to Ouattara would create a government that favored northerners at the expense and marginalization of southerners. Gbagbo feared that such a government would effectively upend the discriminatory, ethnically-based political structure that Gbagbo himself utilized to secure and maintain his power. Therefore, when faced with the decision of conceding defeat and power to Ouattara, or igniting a violent conflict in order to remain in office, his choice was not exactly as easy as Wade’s. However, given the zero-sum political system that contained the possibility of his persecution and his ethnic supporters’ marginalization, Gbagbo was left with little choice. That is simply the nature of a zero-sum political system; an incumbent will do everything to stay in power, even if the refusal to concede sparks the country’s second civil war in two decades.
Not all of this thesis argument is original, even in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. For example, Abu Bakarr Barr writes that “the key problem with liberal democracy in Côte d’Ivoire … is that elections tend to produce winner-takes-all outcomes in a situation where voting is largely based on ethnic or regional identity,” highlighting the causation from politicized ethnicity to zero-sum politics. Thus, while this paper affirms this argument, the incorporation of Higley and Burton’s theory of elite structure strengthens the overall objective of this paper that attempts to explain disparities in electoral concession and power alternation between two countries using equivalent and corresponding mechanisms.
When considering the existing research and literature on this topic of power alternation in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, it is notable that there are more explanations for the Côte d’Ivoire case than that of Senegal. Thus, at least in this specific comparison, this research and literature disparity demonstrates that scholars have focused more on a situation in which something went wrong, namely the lack of electoral concession and a violent transfer of power in Côte d’Ivoire, than on a situation in which something went right, namely the swift electoral concession and achievement of the two-turnover test in Senegal. When applying this to the broader African context, it would be intriguing and informative to see if this disparity holds up. If the disparity in research does exist, perhaps it shines light on why there is a realized disparity in peaceful, democratic power alternation across the continent. And, considering that Senegal’s case of achieving the two-turnover test and democratic consolidation is not the norm on the African continent, it becomes quite evident that more focus needs to be placed on studying why turnovers go right, prompting an opportunity to look forward to a democratizing continent, instead of disproportionately looking back and trying to explain what went wrong. Therefore, as evidenced by the 2019 article in Foreign Affairs entitled, “The Retreat of African Democracy,” it is increasingly important to research the conditions and mechanisms that contribute to democratic consolidation on the African continent. This paper serves to add to that conversation.
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