Mike Brodo

By examining the effect of macro-level political variables on firm-level economic variables, this paper attempts to more deeply understand micro-level political economy in a developing context. The results of this paper fill in the research gaps regarding the effects of state capitalism and political institutions (i.e., state capacity) on firm-level employment growth by demonstrating that in countries with high state capacity, government-owned firms have significantly lower employment growth rates than non-government-owned firms, whereas in countries with low state capacity, government-owned firms have significantly higher employment growth rates than non-government-owned firms.

First published in 1952 at the precipice of the Mau Mau uprising, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu is a short book by Louis Leakey, a Kenyan-born British paleoanthropologist. Intended for British audience, Leakey’s primary motive for penning the book stems from his desire to inform British readers about important Kikuyu customs (given his experience growing up among the Kikuyu and studying their traditions) and also to argue for how the introduction of British colonialism upended these longstanding social customs, ultimately resulting in grievances that brought about the Mau Mau uprising. In the first chapter, Leakey writes, “if we are to understand the underlying causes which made it possible for the movement to come into being and to reach the proportions which it has reached, we must know something of the history and customs of the Kikuyu” (1). Throughout the book, Leakey explains how the social grievances underlining the Mau Mau uprising stemmed from the breakdown of Kikuyu customs (such as those pertaining to the Kikuyu system of clan-based authority and marriage) resulting from British colonization and land dispossession. In contrast to A Grain of Wheat, which focuses on ties of Mau Mau to a broader Kenyan identity, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu specifically focuses on the breakdown of Kikuyu customs and identity as a result of colonization and as an impetus for Mau Mau. However, the two sources are similar in that they identify the breakdown of local customs and traditions stemming from European “modernization” and land dispossession as core grievances stimulating the Mau Mau movement.

This paper argues that the ultimate reason explaining the disparate concession outcomes is a function of zero-sum politics versus positive-sum politics, which are present in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal respectively. Through exploring two underlying, pre-democratization variables, the catalyst of democratization, and two consequential, post-democratization variables, this paper will demonstrate how and why Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire differ in terms of zero-sum/positive-sum politics, and how this ultimate reason explains why Wade chose to peacefully concede his defeat while Gbagbo did not.

Guinea Ecuatorial tiene el mayor PIB per cápita de cualquier país de África, pero esta estadística no cuenta toda la historia; la desigualdad económica es generalizada, con gran parte de la riqueza concentrada en manos de la élite política, especialmente la familia del presidente Obiang (Freixa, 2018). Sin embargo, el país no siempre tuvo entradas dramáticas de riqueza. Antes del descubrimiento del petróleo, Guinea Ecuatorial era uno de los países más pobres (Saadoun, 2017). Por lo tanto, el descubrimiento de petróleo sirve como foco principal para este trabajo, ya que transformó radicalmente las realidades sociales y económicas del país. El descubrimiento del petróleo en la década de 1990 se convirtió en un importante punto de inflexión en Guinea Ecuatorial, y fue el impulso para la desigualdad económica masiva que impregna al país a través de las tres causas directas que se describirán en este trabajo: la falta de gastos y servicios para la salud y educación, los proyectos de infraestructura y las compañías petroleras estadounidenses. Las causas directas ilustradas en este trabajo son el resultado de una falta de responsabilidad del gobierno, y esta falta es un resultado directo de las instituciones antidemocráticas. Por último, las instituciones no inclusivas (como resultado de la falta de responsabilidad y democracia del gobierno) son el culpable principal por la desigualdad económica en Guinea Ecuatorial. Esta desigualdad económica se amplificó por la afluencia masiva de los ingresos del petróleo que creía efectivamente un estado rentista.

While it is unclear what will develop in the near future, it is imperative that the United States continues to enforce its sanctions and uphold its support for democracy and human rights. The United States should promote an end to attacks on political opposition and civil society, the elimination of repressive laws, transparent economic management, and election reform with meaningful national dialogue. Lastly, while the United States should strive to assist with the development of Zimbabwe, it cannot lose sight of the necessary conditions of good governance and respect for human rights.

Concurrent with China’s rapid economic growth over the past two decades has been China’s increasingly deep interest, investment, and relationship with the African continent. China has engaged in considerable trade with African countries and heavily financed development projects. China’s expanding geopolitical influence through the media, military involvement, and diplomatic engagement has introduced ubiquitous new realities on the continent, which the United States should investigate and address more actively. As economic and political ties have deepened between China and Africa, some in the West have become skeptical of China’s intentions and whether negative impacts will arise from Chinese engagement with Africa. On the contrary, many African governments and citizens openly welcome China’s involvement, a major reason being China’s ability to address the infrastructure gap. However, this situation is not purely dichotomous and thus a more nuanced approach is required to assess the potential outcomes for African countries and the United States.

This paper argues that stateness, as defined by “the capacity of the state to exercise its fundamental functions” and maintaining a monopoly on the use of force, is a major determinant of FDI inflows in SSA countries. Through using the independent variable of stateness, which will be qualified and measured using various indicators, and the dependent variable of foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$), this paper will use data from five SSA countries (South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, the Central African Republic, and Somalia) to demonstrate a correlation and causation from state capacity to FDI inflows. The years examined for data purposes are 2008 (sometimes earlier when necessary) until the most current year available in order to align with the 2008-2017 timeframe provided by the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance. This paper will investigate five causal mechanisms of stateness, explain how they are functions of stateness and affect FDI inflows, and then correlate the data and statistics of the mechanisms with the respective countries’ data and statistics regarding FDI inflows. These results show that states with stronger state capacity receive higher FDI inflows, ultimately confirming the hypothesis that high levels of stateness correlate with high levels of FDI inflows (and the converse of low to low).